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When reproductive freedom encounters medical responsibility:
changing conceptions of reproductive choice
SIMONE BATEMAN
Introduction
Sex is no longer the only means of conceiving human
beings. Ever since artificial insemination was first used
two centuries ago, a pregnancy can be obtained
through the use of techniques generally referred to
as reproductive technologyi. These techniques have
created new options for persons who would otherwise
not have had children, but they have also progres-
sively altered the practices and relationships that
condition and give meaning to reproduction in our
society. This is primarily because reproductive
technology is most often made available in a medical
setting, where relationships are defined in therapeutic
terms, where values give precedence to the quality,
security and efficiency of a technical act, and where
physicians are held responsible for the appropriate
management of procedures. Impregnation no longer
has to do with the privacy of one’s sex life, but with
the accomplishment of a medical act. This turning
over of conception to professionals deemed compe-
tent in reproduction leaves some would-be parents
disoriented and even feeling dispossessed of their
customary (often felt to be “natural”) liberty to make
reproductive decisions (1).
Reproduction is today firmly established as an
area of legitimate medical intervention; we must
remember, however, that the presence of a (usually
male) physician at childbirth dates back in Western
Europe to only two centuries—a presence whose sole
initial justification was the medical monopoly of a new
instrument, the forceps, designed to facilitate difficult
births. More recent techniques and procedures in the
area of obstetrics and gynaecology, such as contra-
ception, abortion, the monitoring of fetal growth or
testing for fetal abnormalities during pregnancy, have
since helped solidify physicians’ claim to professional
competence in this domain. Nonetheless, most of these
techniques have given rise to much controversy: the
idea that it is legitimate to control or interfere with
conception and gestation, even under medical
auspices, is far from being a consensual issue in many
societies.
In most countries, assisted reproduction tech-
nology (ART) was originally introduced to treat
infertility. Today it is also being offered to fertile
heterosexual couples as a means of avoiding the risk
of transmitting hereditary disease to their offspring.
Both of these circumstances are generally recognized
as legitimate indications for treatment. Occasionally
i This term can be applied more generally to include all kinds of techniques, including contraception and abortion, whose
purpose is to control or otherwise intervene in the reproductive process. In this paper, we are restricting its use to designate
only those techniques whose ultimate objective is to initiate a pregnancy.
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fertile heterosexual couples have resorted to ART as
a solution to unusual circumstances (such as couples
wishing to select a compatible embryo as an organ
donor for a living child) (2). Single women and lesbians
have also used donor insemination (DI), usually
without medical assistance, as a valid alternative to
sex for conceiving children. These latter uses of ART
remain morally controversial in many countries. But
whether or not an infertility problem exists, the
question of medical responsibility will invariably be
raised whenever a physician is asked to intervene.
Most societies grant physicians considerable
authority in deciding what is to be regarded as the
best way of implementing a medical procedure; they
thus play an important role in defining the values that
guide the use of new technology. However, medical
reproductive and related genetic practices are
procedures whose immediate objective (conceiving a
child) and ultimate consequences (demographic,
psychological, economic, etc.) are not normally
included in the usual scope of a physician’s profes-
sional competence and responsibility. A physician’s
involvement in a patient’s choices about sexuality and
childbearing quite obviously bring into play a broader
scope of values than those immediately linked to the
professionally responsible practice of medicine—
values usually embodied in moral convictions regard-
ing what constitutes a “good” life in terms of sexuality
and procreation, family life, health and handicap. The
legitimacy of medical authority in this domain may
therefore be open to question, creating possibilities
for conflict with conceptions of reproductive liberty.
Reproductive liberty (3) can be defined as the
freedom to make essential choices affecting one’s
reproductive life. A major decision involves choosing
whether or not to have children which, in the case of
an affirmative answer, implies decisions concerning
with whom, when and in what circumstances. Of
course, having children is not necessarily the result
of a conscious decision-making process: social
pressure, interpersonal conflict and personal ambival-
ence often interfere with complex biological processes
not totally under our control, making the final result
of our reproductive lives quite different from our
original plans. A couple’s decision to have a child by
no means guarantees that they will ultimately have
one, even when they appeal to medical assistance.
Nonetheless, the development of techniques the
purpose of which is to increase control over the
consequences of our sexual lives and the different
aspects of our reproductive decisions—whether or
not, with whom, when and in what circumstances—
has reinforced the idea of reproduction as a project
and a consciously controlled process.
But this increase in control paradoxically requires
entry into a new type of reproductive relationship,
loosely if not inappropriately defined as therapeutic.
Infertility is not strictly speaking a disease: it is
certainly a personal and social handicap for the person
who is thus affected, but it is not a life-threatening
disease. Moreover, the concept of infertility which
underlies current use of reproductive technology is a
peculiar construct, in which medical and social criteria
are closely interrelated: it describes as unable to
conceive, not a person with a medically proven
infertility problem, but two particular persons—a
couple—who are unable to conceive a child together,
because one or both are infertile. Treatment, however,
invariably concerns the woman, even when she is not
infertile, as she is the child bearer. Both DI and
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) make this
point particularly clear: the procedure is carried out
on a fertile woman, who could have become pregnant,
had she chosen to do so, by having sexual relations
with another man. In fact, infertility is a relative
concept whose limits are difficult to define: very few
patients are diagnosed as completely sterile, and a
person diagnosed as infertile might have been able to
conceive, had he/she found a more fertile partner.
The fact that infertility is not a disease does not
mean that physicians should not try to treat the
condition. But assisted conception cannot be
considered a cure for either male or female infertility:
neither artificial insemination nor in vitro  fertilization
(IVF) enable their infertile beneficiaries to conceive a
child on their own. In fact, although these techniques
are commonly presented as medical treatment, they
constitute an evident deviation from the standard
approach to healing. Medical treatment aims, when
possible, at identifying and eliminating the cause of a
pathological condition: this may be the case in the first
phases of an infertility work-up and treatment. When
diagnosis has failed to determine a cause, or treatment
to provide a cure, a physician can attempt to eliminate
or alleviate the symptoms of a disease by some form
of palliative treatment. Assisted conception does
address infer-tility’s primary symptom, the absence of
a viable pregnancy, by replicating a defective function
it cannot cure. This, however, creates a totally un-
precedented therapeutic position in that the immediate
medical objective goes beyond the alleviation of
suffering: the aim of reproductive technology is to
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conceive a human being.
Medical assistance with conception thus consists
essentially in providing technical expertise in fertiliza-
tion and impregnation, a task that transforms
physicians, so to speak, into professionally competent
reproductive partners. As such, they find themselves
called upon to intervene in many crucial procreative
decisions. These choices and decisions are all the
more difficult to make, in that the facts that inform them
are still being accumulated or exist only as probabili-
ties. Moreover, the complexity of the therapeutic
relationship, to which must be added the problems
raised specifically by the physician’s involvement in
a reproductive act, concur to create potential for
conflict in which it may no longer be evident who, in
this novel reproductive framework, should be making
fundamental decisions about the coming into exist-
ence of a child. Should they be made by those who,
as professionals, carry out fertilization and
impregnation; by those who, as donors, contribute the
reproductive cells; or by those who, as future parents,
will ultimately assume responsibility for the child to
be born? Deciding who will decide in case of dis-
agreement may involve weighing the physician’s
responsibility for the safety and the favourable
outcome of the procedure against the patient’s
freedom to make reproductive choices.
Many would-be parents do not consider it
necessary to justify their request for assisted concep-
tion: the reasons they wish to have children and the
conditions in which they intend to raise them concern
their private life. But numerous physicians feel that,
given their responsibility as professionals, they
should refuse or discontinue assisted conception, if
they consider that the conditions in which the child
is to be born are unacceptable. When would-be
parents do not acquiesce to the physician’s point of
view, a conflict arises which usually leads to attempts
at arbitration: in France, this usually means the
intervention of a psychologist, referral to an ethics
committee, or recourse to a legal procedure (4).
Conflict may arise over questions of access to
reproductive technology, in particular with respect to
atypical requests for reproductive technology. But
even in more conventional situations, there may be
conflict over the procedure considered most appro-
priate, or over the best solution to unforeseen conse-
quences of an otherwise consensually decided
procedure. Even though physicians, would-be parents
and even donors (5) are all apparently endeavouring
to achieve the same goal—the birth of a child—there
may be significant differences in the way each
protagonist approaches this goal. Regardless of the
differences among protagonists involved in a conflict,
their respective positions often highlight a concurring
moral preoccupation: in what physical and social
conditions is it acceptable to bring a child into the
world? Both physicians and would-be parents, in
justifying their viewpoints, frequently refer to a child’s
best interest. This emotionally charged notion rarely
conveys a precise content or meaning, although it
does eventually serve to articulate normative concerns
about a child’s future. Ultimately, the various versions
of this argument reveal competing visions of the
person, the family, and of life in society; their impact
on the future of childbearing will depend on the
priorities established among these arguments as
conflicts are resolved.
Deciding to have children
One of the main points of conflict between would-be
parents and professionals—and usually a major issue
on the political agenda—is the type of situation in
which reproductive technology may be legitimately
requested. Generally speaking, there are two sorts of
requests. The first usually comes from heterosexual
partners who, unable to achieve a viable pregnancy,
seek medical help. Assisted conception is offered in
these cases to compensate for a couple’s physiol-
ogical incapacity to reproduce, thus bringing society’s
support to the conventional (often perceived as the
“natural”) means of founding a family. The second
type of request, more controversial but arising from
the very existence of these techniques, comes from
persons who do not wish to entertain heterosexual
relationships (single, divorced or widowed men and
women, gay and lesbian partners), but who nonethe-
less wish to have children. Providing assisted concep-
tion in these circumstances recognizes as legitimate
the wish for descendants of those who refuse marriage,
partnership or heterosexuality as a way of life and as
the only suitable framework for raising children.
In many countries, only the first type of request
is considered a socially legitimate reason for access
to reproductive technology. Indeed, the whole notion
of infertility treatment has been constructed around
this indication. And yet, despite apparent differences
between these two types of request, they do seem to
have three points in common: (i) the wish to avoid
sexual relations considered personally, socially or
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morally unacceptable and the emotional complications
they might entail (fidelity to one’s partner appears as
a common concern); (ii) the wish to overcome the
limitations imposed by one’s personal and sexual
preferences, in particular that of having chosen an
infertile partner or form of relationship; and (iii) the
wish for a child of one’s own, understood as a child
emanating from the would-be parents’ body and/or
gametes. These three points often justify the first type
of request, but in many countries, they often
invalidate the second. But if they are considered
problematic in one case, why is this not true in the
other?
The distinction between appropriate and inappro-
priate requests evidently uses the fecund sexual
relation between a man and a woman as the normative
model of procreative behaviour—a model that
supposedly refers to a “natural” order of procreation.
In France, article L. 152-2 of the French 1994 bioethics
law draws on this model, as well as on the social value
attached to voluntary procreation within a stable
relationship, to establish, apparently without ambi-
guity, the conditions in which assisted conception may
legitimately be provided:
The purpose of assisted conception is to
respond to a couple’s request to become
parents. Its objective is to remedy infertility,
the pathological nature of which has been
medically diagnosed. It may also be used to
avoid transmitting a particularly serious
disease to a child. The man and the woman
who form the couple should be alive, be of
reproductive age, married or able to prove at
least two years of cohabitation, and they
should give previous consent to the transfer
of embryos or to insemination.
[my translation]
The attempt to anchor the legitimacy of assisted
conception on the supposedly natural norms of human
reproduction (participation of two live persons of
different sex and of reproductive age) disregards the
manner in which society intervenes to redefine what
is natural in humans. To give an example, the age at
which it is physiologically possible to have children
does not necessarily correspond to the age at which
it is considered socially acceptable to have them. A
physician would probably not offer assisted concep-
tion to an infertile adolescent couple. The biological
norms of reproductive capacity are always reassessed
in the light of social norms defining the aptitude to
become a parent. Even a distinction as biologically
evident as morphological sex differences can turn out
to be an ambiguous criterion, in the rare cases in which
a person has an anomaly of the sexual organs or has
undergone hormonal and/or surgical transformation
of his/her sex. Sexuality itself is reduced, in this
perspective, to its species-oriented function: repro-
duction.
Legislation thus conceived aims to exclude all
normative options that might define assisted concep-
tion as anything other than an exceptional venturing
away from the “normal” ways of founding a family.
The use of reproductive technology as a procreative
alternative to sexuality is perceived as too radical an
option, with unknown social consequences. And yet
the very notion of what constitutes a family has
already been profoundly affected by the increase in
divorce and remarriage, by the growing number of
non-married couples and of same-sex unions. Recent
USA census data (6) indicate that less than a quarter
of the households are made up of married couples with
children, whereas the number of families with children
but no spouse present are increasing, a trend which
is now much advanced and well established in
European countries. Procreative plans and behaviour
have also undergone considerable change with access
to earlier forms of reproductive technology, such as
contraception and abortion. And single women, gays
and lesbians did not wait for reproductive assistance
to have children: many made special sexual arrange-
ments to achieve their purposes and invented new
forms of parental relationships with their children (7).
Of course, DI has contributed in making these
procreative possibilities seem more attractive, parti-
cularly to those who wished to dispense with
opportunistic sexual relations. And some procreative
options were not possible as long as conception took
place entirely within the body. Indeed, IVF now allows
for heretofore unimaginable dissociations of the
reproductive process: the possibility for two separate
forms of biological motherhood (8), the separate
gestation and birth of embryos conceived at the same
time, reproduction with only one or with three sources
of gametes  (9,10) .  But many changes in the
contemporary family cannot be attributed to these
procreative innovations.
The family has never been a natural unit; nor can
it be considered the social expression of the biology
of reproduction. Family forms have varied consider-
ably through time and space, and, in many societies,
324 SIMONE BATEMAN
socially and legally sanctioned kinship relationships
do not necessarily reflect the biological ties between
persons. In many contemporary societies, it is true
that the legal ties binding the spouses in a marriage
usually carry with them the expectation that the
spouses will also be the genitors of the children born
to that marriage. This expectation has for centuries
rested on the moral value of sexual fidelity. But what
institutes the parental tie is a legal act, and not a
biological one: even when a society decides to give
precedence to biological ties in establishing parent-
hood, this is a social decision with its corresponding
justifications and not an imposition on society of an
incontrovertible biological fact (11). Of course, as
knowledge accumulates about the facts of reproduc-
tion and heredity, our own societies may be attributing
an increasing importance to biology in their thinking
about the family. The tendency is then to confuse
scientific truths about conception and heredity with
the social and legal organization of family ties and the
emotional and physical experiences underlying the
quest for children. As biological metaphors and
metonymies for kinship relationships flourish,
evolving from the outmoded notion of blood ties to
the more scientifically modern notion of genetic ties,
we forget that these expressions only signify a more
complex whole.
Given that humanity has known so many family
forms and been so inventive in finding solutions to
the lack of descendants, it is difficult to give credence
to the idea that the “traditional” family is in danger.
The traditional family may simply be a normative ideal
that uses the nuclear family as a landmark to provide
social bearings in times of disquieting change. The
disadvantage with this approach to innovation is that
it defines outright all novelty as unethical or unsafe,
while disregarding what may be morally questionable
in familiar circumstances. Even if unprecedented
options disrupt our usual social and symbolic land-
marks in thinking about procreation and the family,
they do not, for that reason, threaten our humanity.
They do make it vital to rethink the anthropological
foundations of procreation in the light of new options.
Whether science and technology represent a
threat to family relationships and to social stability
may have more to do with our reasons for imple-
menting these new techniques than with the idea that
we may, unwittingly, be destabilizing natural human
phenomena. The risk of interfering with and destabi-
lizing biological mechanisms is real and should not be
minimized, but it is a scientific issue in its own right,
related but separate from the issue concerning the way
a society deals with limitations imposed to human
aspirations by the body and by the environment. The
best way to approach the ethical issues concerning
the effects of reproductive technology on children and
their families may be to examine, not hypothetical
options, but those already available and considered
acceptable, with the unforeseen problems they raise.
We may not have sufficiently explored and understood
the novelty of familiar situations and, in particular, the
role medicalization plays in that novelty. Some of these
issues may have an effect on the family and on
procreation that is more profound than is immediately
evident: in fact, we may have already gone beyond
the controversial issue of whether or not persons in
unconventional family situations should use
reproductive technology to have offspring. The way
decisions are being made about current difficulties
may give us clues to underlying trends, and thus to
the social choices we are really making.
At first glance, occasions for conflict in situations
where the persons being treated are an infertile
heterosexual couple appear to be less frequent and
less radical. There are nonetheless numerous examples
illustrating that, even in the most conventional
indications, unforeseen incidents can create difficult
ethical dilemmas. I speak of dilemmas purposely, in that
many of these situations seem to have no best
solution: they either open a choice between two
equally unknown possibilities, or offer an option
between familiar but inadequate normative references
and novel references whose normative pertinence is
as yet unknown.
Not all issues underlying decision-making in this
area can be handled within the confines of the
therapeutic relationship. Some may ultimately call for
discussion and decision-making at a political level, the
results of which will be diversely affected by the
pertinent social, cultural and economic context in
which a reproductive procedure is being introduced.
In other words, at the heart of the moral issue that
involves choosing the best solution for all the
protagonists involved, is the social issue of deciding
what is the best framework for ensuring the desired
outcome.
Avoiding harm and taking risks
No matter how conventional the familial situation of
those who request procreative assistance, reproduc-
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tive technology involves would-be parents in un-
precedented ways of engaging their sexuated bodies
in a procreative relationship. Reproductive experience
is dismembered and extended in time and space,
especially when conception is externalized. This
multiplies the number of reproductive events calling
for decision-making, and thus the occasions for
unforeseen incidents and conflict. The persons
directly involved in the conception of a human being
are also more numerous: they are not only the would-
be parents, but also the professionals technically
competent in reproduction and eventually the donors
of reproductive cells. If all the protagonists share a
moral obligation to act rightly with respect to them-
selves and to others, those intervening as specialists
have an added obligation to provide care meeting the
standards of the profession.
Ensuring the quality of medical attention provided
to patients requires a translation of this general
principle into concrete technical choices. In strictly
defined therapeutic situations, these choices usually
reflect a consensually defined approach to disease
prevention, in harmony with professional standards
and guidelines for a particular act; they also ideally
reflect the medical staff’s basic ethical stance of
beneficent action in caring for patients. In the case of
reproductive technology, physicians additionally
control access to essential technical and biological
resources that make fertilization possible in a medical
setting; they thus exercise discretionary powers in
basic reproductive decisions, in particular in cases
where procedures require choosing an appropriate
reproductive partner—an egg or a sperm donor. There
is still much discussion among physicians concerning
the criteria on which these choices should be based
and the responsibility associated with the conse-
quences of these choices.
Concretely, questions about medical responsibi-
lity usually arise in situations which involve risk-
taking, and in which the protagonists hold differing
views of what constitutes an acceptable risk in the
light of expected benefits (12–14). In reproductive
procedures, eventual risks first concern the woman’s
health, as she is the primary patient. As such, many
questions raised by conflict between conceptions of
professional responsibility and of patient autonomy
do not differ essentially from those raised in a
traditional therapeutic situation. But as mentioned
earlier, infertility is not a life-threatening disease, nor
is assisted conception treatment for infertility. Failure
to intervene cannot be said to endanger the woman’s
health, as might be the case in some routine therapeu-
tic circumstances, whereas there may be important
risks in undertaking the procedure. Many forms of
assisted conception are physically and emotionally
trying experiences for women; they do not always
result in a live birth, or may do so only after repeated
attempts. Many women may, nonetheless, feel that
not having access to the procedure at all could
provoke personal distress that is just as serious.
What makes matters even more complicated is the
fact that medical concern with risk-taking in reproduc-
tive procedures tends to include an, as yet, non-
existent third party, the unconceived child. Should
professional responsibility for the competent manage-
ment of a reproductive procedure be guided by the
endeavour to do anything more than simply avoid
procedures harmful to the woman’s health and life?
The question is raised acutely in cases where there is
a risk that the child will be born with a serious disorder.
When such a risk is inherent to the procedure, it is in
most cases relatively uncontroversial to stop provid-
ing it. But when the risk for harm derives from the
medical and the social background of the genitors, the
medical stance considered most appropriate is far from
consensual.
Establishing a medically appropriate response to
a person’s request for assistance with conception may
be approached either as a question regarding legally
defined medical responsibility or as a broader concern
with moral responsibility. From a legal perspective, a
physician in normal therapeutic circumstances is
obliged to propose the necessary means to restore
health, but is not held responsible for the outcome of
treatment, if the procedure has been performed
correctly. In certain situations, physicians occasion-
ally experience these minimal legal requirements as
insufficient from a moral perspective. In the case of
assisted conception, physicians may even feel that
the reverse relationship is true: physicians should not
be obliged to propose systematically the means of
conceiving, but may be held responsible for the
outcome (12–15).
In both perspectives, the fundamental question
remains the same: in so far as reproductive technology
is not, strictly speaking therapeutic, what criteria
define the competent and responsible enactment of a
reproductive procedure? An answer to this question
requires agreeing on what is the outcome of that
procedure. The immediate objective is a viable
pregnancy, for as long as this objective is not attained,
the procedure will be repeated. There might however
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be a limit to the number of times a procedure may be
attempted, without harm to the patient. But when the
procedure succeeds, does the physician’s
accountability stop there? Or is the physician
ultimately responsible for the state in which the child
will be born? If the latter is the case, to what extent is
this true? Quite obviously, different definitions of the
outcome of a procedure affect working conceptions
of appropriate action.
Three recurrent dilemmas are encountered by
physicians in routine practice. These dilemmas often
oblige them to reconsider the assumptions on which
their practice is based. In many cases, the dilemma will
first arise as a technical problem requiring a profes-
sional response, but as physicians try to solve it, the
social and ethical significance of the problem comes
to the surface. In some cases, they become a source
of conflict with patients. Their immediate solution
does not seem to involve finding a right answer, but
reaching an agreement among all concerned as to how
the priorities in decision-making will be distributed
throughout the procedure. This implies identifying the
possible consequences on the child and the family of
each solution and on whom the responsibility for these
particular consequences will rest. The three dilemmas
are as follows.
1. In what circumstances is the transition from
sexuality to assisted conception justified?
This problem arises in routine practice with both fertile
and infertile couples. In the case of infertile couples,
the question essentially involves deciding when one
should consider that treatment of infertility has failed
and that it is legitimate to go on to offer palliative
solutions, such as assisted conception. One example
of such a dilemma is choosing whether or not to try a
curative option such as microsurgery of blocked
fallopian tubes, which may not succeed, or go on to
the palliative option, IVF. Another is whether or not
therapeutic action should be delayed, such as in cases
of low fertility where there is a statistically significant
chance that a couple might conceive. Medical
attitudes vary with respect to this problem: some will
persist in delaying treatment or attempting curative
solutions if the chances for success seem reasonable,
on the basis that restored fertility and thus reproduc-
tive autonomy is the best solution for the couple.
Others may feel that precious time, in particular with
respect to female fertility, may be lost with treatment
of uncertain benefit, thus diminishing the chances of
arriving at the essential objective, a live birth.
The problem also arises in the treatment of
couples who request assisted conception with donor
gametes to avoid transmitting a serious disease (such
as HIV) or a hereditary disorder to the child. The
couple is not infertile and, in the case of recessive
hereditary conditions, each partner would have been
able to conceive children without that particular risk
had they been with another partner who was a non-
carrier of the same trait. Moreover, when the male
partner is the carrier, he must use some form of
contraception during the period of insemination.
Abstaining from using one’s procreative capacities is
often difficult to accept, even when one is perfectly
conscious of the risks involved; in fact, on occasion,
the child born after DI is afflicted with the disease,
because no contraception had been used. In the case
of a dominant hereditary condition, the problem is
simpler to resolve: a vasectomy or tubal ligation
permanently avoids the risk of transmitting a geneti-
cally determined condition. Assisted conception is
then more easily justified on the grounds of infertility.
In the situations I have observed, contrary to what
might be expected, geneticists and physicians are
quite reticent to push a couple into a situation in which
they must abandon the idea of conceiving on their
own. They often prefer recommending genetic
counselling and prenatal diagnostic techniques. The
use of donor gametes is proposed only when no
genetic testing for the condition is available, the
genetic condition under consideration is serious, and
the risk of transmission very high. They will also
accept requests from couples having had to terminate
several pregnancies after amniocentesis.
In all of these situations, it is the high probability
of not conceiving a child at all or of conceiving a child
stricken by a serious or life-threatening health
condition that justifies the move to assisted concep-
tion. Physicians perceive the couple’s sexual rela-
tions, even when the partners are fertile, as being, for
all practical purposes, sterileii. This approach to the
problem validates medical interference in the intimate
realm of impregnation. It often also validates the
ii It is my view that a definition of infertility, not as an individual incapacity to conceive (and bear) a child, but as an incapacity
to produce a healthy child, will play a major role in the way both reproductive technology and genetic diagnosis and therapy
will evolve as medical practices in the future.
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exclusion of single women, lesbians, and women
having reached menopause.
But there are other unusual requests that do not
fit so neatly into one of the slots of this dichotomy.
For example, most physicians would not refuse to treat
any person with a medically diagnosed infertility
problem, no matter what their sexual and relational
preferences iii  but many might balk at the idea of
extending their services to assisted conception.
Another example: although most physicians refuse to
offer assisted conception to a menopausal women
(who by definition cannot benefit from regular treat-
ment for infertility), most physicians would find it
unacceptable not to offer assisted conception to a
woman whose premature menopause has been
medically induced.
Some cases are highly controversial, even among
physicians themselves. One interesting borderline
case is the following: what if the persons requesting
assisted conception are a couple in which the male
partner is a transsexual? iv  Here, as in the case of pre-
mature menopause, the infertility results from medical
intervention that amounts to castration: the endo-
crinological and surgical transformation of a woman
into a man. Those who oppose treating such couples
feel that, just as in the case of single women or
lesbians, the new situation created is not a “natural”
situation of heterosexual infertility. But others feel that
it is difficult to refuse a request coming from persons
whose status as man and woman has been recognized
civilly, sometimes even by marriage, and whose
infertility is the result of recognized therapy for trans-
sexualism.
Another example: is it a physician’s role to propose
an alternative in circumstances that create obstacles
to heterosexual relations? When these obstacles are
related to physical health (for example, the husband
is a paraplegic), physicians accept. But when the
circumstances are social, such as employment that
keeps a couple apart for great lengths of time,
physicians tend to refuse. On some rare occasions,
the competent administrative authorities in France
have asked physicians to inseminate the wife or partner
of a man serving a prison term, whose wife will have
reached menopause at his release. Here the couple’s
sterility is due to the social constraints placed on the
heterosexual relationship, not only by the prison term,
but also by the fact that sexual relations are not
allowed in French prisons.
The underlying dilemma in all these unusual
situations remains the same as in the conventional
situations: when is it justified to abandon sexuality
for assisted conception? However, the question is no
longer framed in terms of real or effective infertility,
either because fertility is not a problem (single women,
lesbians, separated couple) or because infertility is an
accepted constitutional and socially recognized state
(menopause, transsexualism). Most nonmedically
motivated requests for assisted conception are
founded on the idea of nondiscrimination in access
to reproductive procedures. The question remains as
to whether there are justifiable limits to free access.
If our societies decide to no longer restrict
procreative possibilities to heterosexual relations or
to medically justified procedures using marital hetero-
sexuality as a normative reference, two problems are
raised. The first requires rethinking our kinship
relationships in such a way that they take into account
all forms of procreation. The second requires review-
ing a physician’s responsibility in situations where the
demand for professional competence is restricted to
implementation of a procedure, with practically no
intervention in the area of diagnosis 5 . We must not
forget, however, that, in the background, a definition
of infertility, not as an individual incapacity to con-
ceive and bear a child but as a conjugated incapacity
to produce a healthy child, is probably playing a major
role in extending the medical (and therefore apparently
noncontroversial) indications for both reproductive
technology and genetic diagnosis and therapy.
2. To what extent is a physician’s responsibility
involved when, in the context of assisted
conception, there is a risk of harming either
the woman or the future child through the
procedure?
As mentioned earlier, many of the responsibility
issues in assisted conception are similar to those in
any kind of treatment; they require an appropriate
control of professional negligence by members of the
profession through the setting of standards of
practice. There is now relative consensus on how to
handle some of the major risk problems of assisted
iii They might refuse to treat persons with a serious disease or a mental health condition.
iv These requests were first made in France in the mid-eighties. They have become more frequent in the past few years.
v This type of medical but nontherapeutic situation already exists with respect to contraception and abortion.
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conception, such as ovarian stimulation and the
number of embryos to be transferred to the womb after
IVF (usually a maximum of three). But there is a
tendency to disregard these standards when both
physician and patient fear that caution will only be
rewarded by the absence of a viable pregnancy.
Consensus is much more difficult to obtain when
the risk involves transmitting a serious or life-
threatening condition to the future child, because this
risk is not immediately linked to the implementation
of the procedure but to the medical history of its
genitors (parents or donors). As we have just seen,
physicians often perceive this risk as a justifiable
medical indication for assisted conception even in
fertile couples, as well as for screening donors to
prevent the inadvertent transmission of disease. This
screening in some countries, notably France, includes
genetic screening of recipients, to avoid pairing a
donor with a recipient who is a carrier of the same
recessive trait. Most preventive measures taken in the
interests both of the woman and the child are relatively
uncontroversial (HIV testing of donors, for example);
but can a physician go too far in attempting to prevent
disease in children born through assisted conception?
The disquieting spectre of eugenics raises its head.
The birth of a healthy child can never be guaran-
teed, no matter how many preventive measures are
taken. Medicine’s increased capacity to detect and
eventually to prevent genetically determined condi-
tions and malformations does not necessarily mean
an increase in control over genetic parameters: they
are too numerous, and the relationships between them
too complex to be totally under control, even in a single
specific situation. Physicians do nonetheless feel that,
over and beyond their concern for their immediate
patient, the woman, they can and must attempt to
maintain the risks incurred by the future child at a limit
defined as acceptable. However, the very task of
defining such a limit in concrete terms is a complex
and controversial process, even among physicians
themselves. It is often quite easy for them to agree on
the objective data that characterize a particular
condition or a procedure, as well as on the objective
data that describe the situation of the patient whose
case is being considered. But evaluating the serious-
ness of a condition, the importance of the risk involved
(is 5% or 10% a high or low risk?), and consequently
deciding whether or not that condition justifies
medical intervention (or on the contrary, refraining
from intervening), requires subjective appraisal of
objective medical data. At this point, the varied
clinical experience of physicians with their patients as
well as their divergent professional and personal
moral views come into play, making consensus as to
what constitutes an “acceptable” risk, in some cases,
an unattainable ideal.
For example, in the case of donor screening, many
physicians feel that it is unacceptable to use the semen
of a man certain or suspected of being a carrier of a
serious genetic condition and, in the case of certain
recessive conditions, that can be found frequently in
the population, and for which there is a high risk of
transmission. When the genetic origin of a condition
has not been clearly established (for example, in the
case of a donor who has been cured of cancer), they
also feel that, in the absence of conclusive data, it is
unacceptable for the physician to take the responsi-
bility of accepting such a donor. Risk-taking here
concerns someone else’s offspring.
But is a physician responsible in the same way for
the outcome of a pregnancy, when the risk of transmit-
ting a genetically determined condition emanates from
the parents’ family history? In some cases, physicians
discover that the woman, whose partner is infertile, is
herself a carrier of a serious dominant condition, but
which she only has in a minor form; this is often the
reason why it was first overlooked. In other cases, she
might be a carrier of a serious dominant condition
(such as polyposis of the colon) which is a late-onset
disease of variable penetrance. A more recent problem
concerns the appropriateness of proposing ICSI to
couples in which male infertility is associated with
being a carrier of a statistically frequent and serious
recessive condition, cystic fibrosis. Contrary to the
situation in which it is decided to exclude a potential
donor, because someone else’s offspring will be
affected, the decision to refuse assisted conception
on the basis of the parents’ family history, even when
this attitude seems medically justified, is experienced
by many physicians as a “questionable decision”.
Is there a dividing line, and if so where, between
the physician’s responsibility for controlling the medi-
cal factors which intervene during a pregnancy and
the couple’s autonomy in decision-making regarding
their reproductive lives? Does the fact that the birth
of a handicapped child implies expensive medical
treatment, usually paid for by the state, weigh as a valid
counterargument against the fact that ultimately it is
the parents who assume responsibility for raising the
child? In other words, who assumes responsibility for
the consequences of risk-taking in childbearing and
how does this affect their right to decide?
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These questions are raised most acutely in cases
where an at-risk pregnancy is monitored with prenatal
diagnostic techniques. The probability of giving birth
to a child with a serious disease or malformation can
be determined with certainty, but some anomalies of
the karyotype may be detected whose consequences
for the health of the child are unknown. When in
doubt, physicians and parents may have differing
attitudes about pursuing the pregnancy. After amnio-
centesis, a physician may refuse to terminate a
pregnancy if this does not seem medically justified,
but cannot force a woman to abort, even if from a
medical viewpoint this seems acceptable. One could
imagine similar scenarios in the case of prenatal
genetic diagnosis (PGD), where a physician may refuse
to initiate a pregnancy by not transferring affected
embryos, but cannot impose a transfer against the
woman’s will (4).
A patient may legitimately question professional
standards, as well as a physician’s right to intervene
in as personal a decision as whether or not to accept
the birth of a child with a mental or physical deficiency.
The physician him/herself may question this right to
intervene. For in fact, medical and lay definitions of
an acceptable risk, which frequently pit patients
against physicians, also tend to overlap and even-
tually to conflict even in the physician’s own
reasoning: a physician’s personal values with respect
to the very sensitive problem of reproductive choices,
also influence his/her professional attitudes vi (16).
What ultimately makes this problem such a
troubling one is that, even if professionals are respon-
sible for correctly establishing a probability of risk,
once that risk is known, deciding what is an acceptable
risk becomes a joint moral issue for all the protagonists
involved. At length, it is also a social and policy issue
because it requires deciding how far physicians may
interfere in would-be parents’ procreative decisions,
to maintain their professional standards of risk-taking.
Physicians are, after all, the present gatekeepers of
reproductive technology.
3. To what extent is a physician accountable
for the social conditions in which a child will
be born?
Beyond concern with donor screening, most countries
still honour a tradition, stemming from almost a
century of practising DI, that allows parents—if they
so desire—to conceal from family, friends and even
the child, the means by which the child was con-
ceived. This requires a policy of donor anonymity, but
also selecting a donor whose physical traits match
those of the would-be couple. Minimal matching
involves controlling for such traits as skin colour (and
in some cases hair and eye colour), as well as blood
group. Proceeding in this manner makes it plausible
to the ordinary observer that the parents conceived
the child.
However, some donors have hereditary traits
that do not justify exclusion but that could become
markers revealing the parents’ recourse to a donor
procedure. Several genetic traits fall into this category,
but each one poses different problems. A donor who
is a known heterozygote for a recessive condition that
neither of the parents have, has a 1in 2 possibility of
transmitting this trait to the child. However, this trait
is not visible, at least in the first generation: at most,
the child will himself or herself be a heterozygote for
that condition and will therefore be healthy. A cleft
palate and a harelip are also hereditary malforma-
tions; they are visible, but operable defects. But they
do not necessarily function as markers, because
sporadic (nongenetically determined) cases are also
possible. On the other hand, a polydactyl donor
(having more than the usual number of digits on the
hands or feet) has a visible hereditary trait, which does
not threaten the child’s health but which indisputably
acts as a marker of DI. Should such a donor be
accepted?
Acceptance of such donors raises, as in our
preceding dilemma, questions about the extent and
the limits of genetic screening. Should physicians
avoid the deliberate transmission of any harmful or
anomalous genes; or should they attempt only to
prevent the most disabling hereditary conditions? In
the latter case, it must not be forgotten that evaluating
the seriousness of a condition is never a totally
objective procedure. Accepting such donors also
presupposes that would-be parents are aware of the
criteria that guide physician selection of donors in
good health, and that they are ready to surpass the
need for secrecy. And yet it has been this guarantee
of secrecy that has allowed the practice to thrive and
vi An interesting international comparative study, directed by D.Wertz and J. Fletcher of the attitudes of clinical geneticists
from 19 different countries confronted with a typical set of difficult cases, shows how values concerning medical decisions
related to genetics, which often imply reproductive choices, vary from one society to another, as well as among individual
practitioners, in particular according to their age, sex and religious practice.
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to become socially acceptable, at least to a certain
extentvii.
In associating, for reproductive purposes, two
persons unknown to each other, who will not be recog-
nized socially as the child’s parents, the physician
quite obviously plays a role that surpasses medical
responsibility for correct implementation of a
procedure. Paradoxically, this role as mediator in a
morally delicate situation has always seemed self-
evident. In recent years however, the psychological
and moral validity of donor anonymity and of secrecy
about the child’s origins has been questioned. Semen
banks in some countries offer nonidentifying informa-
tion concerning donors and may even allow would-
be parents to choose. Donated eggs are so difficult
to obtain, that many physicians are now opting for
nonanonymous donations, because women accept
more willingly to undergo the risks of the procedure
if the beneficiary is a friend or relative. These changes
imply reconsidering the physician’s role in donor
procedures, as well as the criteria and purpose of
screening and matching donors with recipients. Many
of what may seem self-evident decision-making
criteria are implicit suppositions about stable family
life, child development, and concepts of health and
normality. These must ultimately be submitted to open
social discussion and some aspects of donor matching
may call for policy decisions.
Questions about the physician’s role and respon-
sibility as mediator in a reproductive procedure also
arise in nondonor procedures, in particular when an
unforeseen incident changes the context in which
assisted conception is being offered. One example is
the unexpected death of the woman’s husband or
partner after treatment has been initiated (4). Some-
times frozen semen or embryos are still in storage and,
on several occasions, women have requested the
treatment be continued, alleging not only that this is
their last chance to conceive, but that they wish to
have the child of their deceased husband. Physicians’
attitudes have varied and, in some cases, they have
chosen to pursue treatment; but independently of the
final action taken, concern has always been expressed
about purposely favouring the birth of a child whose
father is deceased. If the initial request was considered
acceptable, to what extent, if at all, are the social condi-
tions of a child’s birth a physician’s responsibility?
Most physicians do not restrict their evaluation
of a medical indication for treatment to the physical
symptoms. The choice of the most adequate treatment
often takes into consideration a patient’s finances,
family surroundings, mental health, etc. In the case
of assisted conception, the social condition of the
would-be parents—married and in many countries
cohabiting couples of acceptable procreative age—
is part of the criteria defining the so-called medical
indication. In this sense, the refusal of physicians to
pursue treatment when the couple’s social condition
has changed (death or illness of one of the partners,
divorce) appears to be a logical sequel to the initial
stance. In this sense, our last dilemma returns to the
first, the difference being that what appears as a
socially unacceptable context arises from an unfore-
seen incident in a conventional situation, and not from
the characteristics of the initial request.
Conclusion
What are the consequences for a society of having
chosen to develop a medically mediated form of
reproduction? The fact that would-be parents, what-
ever their social status, are asking physicians to
provide the means of accomplishing what was once
an intimate act is hardly an anodyne fact. Whatever
the differences in technical variants, reproductive
technology appears essentially to be “emancipating”
procreation from the usual conditions of heterosexual
commerce. Artificial insemination has long since
desexualized the act of conception. IVF has now
disembodied conception, a trend that could be
extended to the rest of pregnancy by creating the
conditions for ectogenesis. The prospect of cloning
now augurs the emancipation of procreation from what
still remains the fundamental requirement of sexual
reproduction, the participation of sexually differen-
tiated beings, and introduces the possibility of using
reproductive cells (embryonic stem cells) for non-
reproductive therapeutic purposes. What seems to be
at stake in the development of these practices is a
transformation of the anthropological conditions of
procreation.
Should these new ways of conceiving become
available to all persons who express a desire for
vii The fact that secrecy is the most frequent attitude found among parents of children conceived with donor gametes belies the
fact that this particular way of conceiving children and the kinship it establishes is not always perceived and experienced as
legitimate.
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children, or should they only be dispensed to persons
in particular situations? Diverse variables affect both
the ways in which the question is raised and the
manner in which a society explores the reasons it has
for implementing these techniques. Generally speak-
ing, some countries favour a rights approach to issues
of choice, giving more space to the political expression
of atypical requests; others prefer an approach
establishing the limits of what is socially permissible,
devolving to physicians as professionals competent
in reproduction the task of supervising the respect of
these limits. However, the tendency to dissociate
issues of reproductive freedom from the medical
contexts in which they often arise tends to blind us
to the constant interaction of issues of choice with
matters of medical responsibility, as well as to the fact
that the contours of professional competence and
responsibility is a social and ethical issue in its own
right.
This paper comes to no major conclusion as to the
best way to proceed. How can it, when many of these
issues are still emotionally charged objects of moral
and political dissent? It does, however, distinguish
some strong underlying trends in the development of
these practices.
1. There seems to be a trend, even in conservative
countries like France, to increasing acceptance of
unconventional requests for assisted conception.
This is happening, not through open political
debate about rights and discrimination, but
through the constant redefinition of what consti-
tutes acceptable conditions for access to treatment,
in particular through extensive interpretations of
infertility and disease prevention.
2. Issues related to changes in the family are basically
examined from the point of view of nonmedically
motivated requests for assisted conception (single
women and lesbians, menopausal women). Less
attention is being given to the way medical reasons
and, in particular, motives for genetic screening and
diagnosis, are progressively shaping aspects of
individual procreative choice. Mounting concern
with the transmission of genetically determined
conditions may have profound effects on the way
persons meet and decide to have or not to have
children, as well as the type of health care they
seek. There may be significant differences between
those who decide to take preventive measures and
those who do not—differences that most certainly
reflect the way persons deal with the disability that
afflicts their family.
3. These two trends are intimately linked to evolving
conceptions of medical responsibility, an aspect of
development in this area of medical practice that is
far from getting the attention it needs. In some
cases, physicians seem to be offering new options
to persons who had no hope of having children;
but they are also creating new constraints on
procreative liberty. Some constraints imposed by
a physician’s concern with taking appropriate
medical action may be based on valid arguments,
pertinent to their field of competence (certain kinds
of screening). Other constraints appear more
questionable (limiting assisted conception to cases
of infertility), but may occasionally derive from a
social function attributed to physicians by society
as part of the responsible exercise of his/her profes-
sion. All of these aspects merit close evaluation
and, in the case of the latter, more open social and
political debate. For as expectations grow regarding
their technical competence and as the scope of their
professional activity increases, physicians may,
more often than not, be asked to make essential
reproductive choices, even by the “patients”
themselves.
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